EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY STUDY OF POOR RICE DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION IN SURABAYA

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The purpose of this research is to examine the effectiveness and efficiency of the poor rice distribution (Raskin) program from 2015 to 2016 in Surabaya. This research was conducted in six different districts of Surabaya, they are Sukolilo, Mulyorejo, Bubut, Gubeng, Rungkut, and Genteng District. This research used descriptive analysis method to find the effectiveness and efficiency based on accuracy indicators of targets, number of poor recipient, prices, time, administration, and quality. This research used primary and secondary data. Primary data was collected from 90 people who are registered to this program (poor people) and secondary data was collected from Central Bureau Statistic. The result of this study indicates that the implementation of the program has not fully effective yet. Based on the analysis, all sub districts the target household beneficiaries (RTS-PM) still purchase the rice at a price above the average (normative) (Rp 1.600/kg). The target household beneficiaries do not object if the government increases the purchase price of the rice which is the normal price of the rice at their home. In order to make the implementation of the Raskin program more effective, this research recommends the government to develop a control system of the implementation of Raskin program in the political sub district and involves the financial support from the local authorities for the raskin program.

Keywords: The Normative Price of Raskin, Purchase Price of Raskin, Political District Deliberation (MUSKEL), The Raskin Program, Target Household Beneficiaries (RTS-PM)

1. INTRODUCTION

Poor rice program (Raskin) is a national program that aims to help poor households in meeting the adequacy of food needs and reduce the financial burden through the provision of subsidized rice. The number of poor people at 31.02 million in 2010 was still quite high, the unemployment rate was seen to be still quite high, although it had been successfully reduced from 11.24% in 2005 to 6.56% in August 2011, the number of underdeveloped areas scattered in various regions is still quite high. To deal with these problems the 2015 Government Work Plan (RKP) carries the theme of Acceleration and Expansion of Inclusive and Equitable Economic Growth for the Improvement of People's Welfare. In India, Public Distribution System (PDS), Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) and the Mid-Day Meal Scheme (MDMS) are the three main pillars of the food based assistance programs in India (Pingali, P., et al, 2017; Rahman, A, 2016)

The Raskin program, which is realized in 6 Properly, that is the right target, the right amount, the right quality, the right time, the right price and the right administration. A coordinated reaction of fiscal and monetary policies via subsidized price tagging can improve aggregate welfare (Ginn, W and Pourroy, M, 2018). Raskin Program stakeholders, especially in the Province and District / City still need to improve their performance and coordination by contributing their resources so Raskin distribution to Target Households Beneficiary (RTS-PM) is more effective in achieving the 6 (six) Right target. Therefore the implementation of the Raskin program is very
dependent on the role of the Regional Government such as socialization, quality control, transportation, operational costs etc. (Raskin, 2015). in Sub Saharan Africa, subsidized has influence food security (Ragasa, C and Mazunda, J, 2018).

Raskin's RTS-PM in 2012 to 2014 was determined based on the 2011 Social Protection Program Data Collection (BPS, 2011). It is hoped that the data will no longer invite debate in the region. Even so, it needs to be realized that poverty is dynamic and relative. In 2012 the Government will implement a new policy in the RTS data collection system conducted by the National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K), the Secretariat of the Vice President, namely the Integrated Database of Social Protection Program which reaches 40% of the population (Raskin, 2012). However, the assessment of program success cannot be done partially because Raskin is a unified program to deliver subsidized rice to poor households. The problem of Raskin implementation occurs a lot from distribution points to recipient households.

Raskin is one form of the Indonesian government's public policy in distributing rice specifically for poor households (Tabor and Sawit, 2001). The Raskin program began in 1998 under the name OPK (Special Market Operations) which functioned as a social safety net to strengthen food security for poor households after the 1997 financial crisis. In 2002, the function of the program was expanded as social protection for the community (social protection) and its name is changed to Raskin to be more targeted (Bulog, 2010a). Based on ethnographic fieldwork on California’s Northern Central Coast, the subsidized program act to reinforce structural food insecurity by ensuring that workers are provided with their most basic needs (Minkoff-Zern, L, 2014). Asian countries where adoption of direct rice seeding is increasing, and estimate that red rice can have significant impacts on global food security (Morat, A., et al, 2018).

The main problem with the Raskin program is that the beneficiaries are not precisely targeted because of misperceptions from the community and village officials regarding the Raskin program. Many cases in the field show that Raskin is divided evenly or in rotation for social reasons, togetherness, mutual cooperation and so on. There are still people who are not included in the poor category, but ask for Raskin quota. On the contrary there are still poor households that have not received Raskin (Hastuti et al., 2008; Asmara and Hutagaol, 2009). The purpose of this study is to understand the level of effectiveness and efficiency of rice distribution programs for the poor in the city of Surabaya.

2. METHOD

The research approach in this study is descriptive-analytical research for solving the problems that exist today, especially the problems of distributing rice to the poor in the city of Surabaya. The selection of sub-districts in the city of Surabaya as research locations is as follows: six (6) sub-districts in which each sub-district is chosen, the three sub-districts, namely Rungkut, Mulyorejo, Genteng, Gubeng, Bubutan and Sukolilo, each sub-district will be chosen. collected in this research activity includes secondary data and primary data. Secondary data is collected from various related agencies such as the Central Statistics Agency (BPS), and government agencies. Primary data was collected from respondents through FGDs and in-depth interviews with poor people receiving 15 people of rice per sub-district. Data analysis was carried out based on six performance indicators that were examined, namely: (1) Targets Appropriateness, (2) Quantities Appropriateness, and (3) Prices Appropriateness.
3. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The implementation of Raskin distribution is the responsibility of two institutions, namely the National Logistics Agency (Bulog) and the regional government. The Bureau of Logistics is responsible for distributing rice to distribution points, while the regional government is responsible for distributing rice from distribution points to target households. So far, the National Logistics Agency has carried out its duties relatively well and in accordance with the rules of implementation. The principle of Raskin management is alignment, transparency, participation and accountability. Alignment to the RTS-PM, whose meaning is to encourage RTS-PM to participate actively in the planning, implementation, control and preservation of all Raskin activities both in the Sub-districts and District, including beneficiaries. Transparency, which means opening access to information among Raskin actors, especially Raskin beneficiaries, who must know, understand and understand Raskin activities. Participation, whose meaning is to encourage the community to play an active role in each stage of Raskin, starting from the socialization, planning, implementation and control stages. Accountability, the meaning of which is to remind that every management of Raskin activities must be accountable to the local community as well as to all competent parties in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations or agreed upon. The principle of organizing the program is under the direct responsibility of the Mayor of Surabaya, who is responsible for allocating the Raskin ceiling, providing and distributing rice, completing HPB payments and administering Raskin distribution in the region. The scope of responsibility at the sub-district level is (1) Forming a coordination team for Raskin distribution in its area. (2) Planning, implementing, controlling, disseminating, monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the Raskin program and reporting the results to the Raskin coordination team.

5.1 Effectiveness of Raskin Program

3.1.1 Target Appropriateness

The target of the Raskin Program is poor households (RTS-PM). The RTS-PM have been selected through the Sub-district Conference (MUSKEL) and recorded in the list of beneficiaries (DPM-1). The findings in the field indicate that poor rice recipients are not only RTS-PM registered in DPM-1, but also other households that are not registered. In fact, many of them are actually not classified as poor, it can be seen in table 2. The survey results show that in all villages studied the number of households receiving Raskin with RTS-PM data is the same, so that in all villages there is no difference between the data RTS-PM and actual data on the field.

3.1.2 Quantities Appropriateness

The direct implication of the bloating of the poor family beneficiaries of the Raskin above is the depletion of the quantity of raskin received by poor families of kg. According to the Raskin Guidelines 2011, the normative quota for each RTS-PM is 15 / KK / month. The field survey results shown in table 3 show the fact that the actual number of Raskin received by the recipient families is the same as the normative quota. However, surveys conducted by researchers in the field still have recipients of Raskin who do not receive it according to the provisions due to the centralized collection of Raskin in the local sub-districts that distributes not in accordance with the RTS-PM data because there are still residents in the field who have not been recorded as recipients of Raskin, so those who have not been recorded given as a result those who should receive 15 kg only receive 10 kg. This is as expressed by some village heads in the sub-districts in table 2.
3.1.3 Price Appropriateness

In fact, the price paid by the recipients of Raskin is not the same as the actual price of Raskin, which is Rp1,600 / kg, the price paid by the recipient of Raskin is Rp. 1,800 / kg and there is even a sub-districts that is more than Rp. 1,800, - because in each village the cost is the costs charged to the recipient of Raskin such as transportation costs, port fees and others, so that the price of Raskin is greater than the actual price of ransom, this was revealed by several Raskin recipients in several districts in table 2.

**Tabel 2. Comparison Targets and Realization of the effectiveness of the Raskin program (targets, quantities and prices)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Sub-Districts</th>
<th>Target (N)</th>
<th>Quantities (kg/month)</th>
<th>Prices (IDR/kg)</th>
<th>Realization (N)</th>
<th>Quantities (kg/month)</th>
<th>Prices (IDR/kg)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Rungkut</td>
<td>Kalirungkut</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rungkut</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kidul Kedung</td>
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<td>7.140</td>
<td>1.800</td>
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<td>Mulyorejo</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>9.375</td>
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</table>

6. CONCLUSIONS

The implementation of the Raskin program in the study areas in 2015 and 2016 has provided Raskin assistance that is needed by the poor who are the target group (RTS-PM group). However, the Raskin program has not been effective enough in its implementation. Due to the fact that the amount of quota received by poor households (RTM) that are the target group in the Raskin program is not in accordance with the normative quota set by the government, the price of the Raskin ransom paid by them is also far above the price of ripe raskin which is normatively set by the government (Rp. 1,600 / kg), while the Raskin distribution efficiency has actually been efficient, as seen from the Raskin distribution mechanism which is not too long and there is already control at
all levels, but it is still not under supervision. RTM actually does not mind if the government raises
the price of Raskin ransom, but there are conditions that they propose, namely the price of new
ransom is the price of fair in their homes. The implementation of the Raskin program at the sub-
district level must be upheld according to the rules set by the government in order to achieve its
objectives effectively, namely reducing the economic burden of poor households. The
recommendations given to the government are an increase in the number of raskin received by the
RTS-PM and the redeemed price. In addition, increasing awareness of people who do not belong to
RTS-PM to not enjoy Raskin is also needed so that the Raskin quota is really only enjoyed by the
titled RTS-PM.

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