From State-Led Regionalism to Multi-track Regionalism

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Abstract

This paper aims to elaborate the new circumstances of South East Asia and its impact to form of cooperation and architecture of ASEAN. Despite the ASEAN countries still maintain the state-led regionalism principle, but various changes that took place in this region has risen a various issues that push the emergence of new actors such as seen in the emergence of transnational advocacy netwoks. The limitations of the state-centric regionalism leave the problem of representation. This means that the state perspective will be more determined by political and technocratic calculations. By proposing multitrack regionalism concept, this paper try to show that state-led regionalism is needed to transform into community-led regionalism in order to realize a more democratic regionalism.
Key words:, ASEAN Community,state-led regionalism, mulitrack regionalism, non-traditional issue

INTRODUCTION

ASEAN Community has become a major topic in a various research proposals. In the level of government, several countries in the region has developed a public campaign through many ways and media in order to welcome the ASEAN Community project. With some variations in degree and intensity of socialization, it seems clear that the formation of the ASEAN Community by 2015 is a momentum which has been prepared by "the leaders of ASEAN countries". It is important to emphasize on "the leaders of ASEAN countries" in this paper because the architecture of the ASEAN region by 2015 fully reflect the characteristics and patterns of decision-making in this association. The domination of state in transformation of regionalism in Southeast Asia is maintained since ASEAN emergence until nowadays.

Single Track Regionalism

There are many rounds of negotiations and summit in ASEAN countries to concrete the new architecture of regional cooperation. The momentum appears especially after implementing ASEAN Summit 9th that held in Bali, October 2003. Through consensus Bali Concord II, ASEAN agreed on the formation of the ASEAN Community 2015. The road map for implementing the ASEAN Community by 2015 and then confirmed at the ASEAN Summit 14th held in Cha-am, Thailand in 2009. Under the tagline "One Vision, One Identity, One Community" the 10 ASEAN members agreed three important pillars as decided in the Bali Concord II *(The Road Map, ASEAN Secretariat, 2013)*. The *Road Map* shows in detail and systematic steps should be made ASEAN countries and communities in the region by 2015. ASEAN also agreed to support the ASEAN Community in 2015 with three main pillars: the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). These are the three pillars that many thought would bring a new landscape that will bring the people in Southeast Asia to the identity and trans-national communities and more cosmopolitan. Several meetings were conducted by officials from ASEAN are always directed towards the implementation of the three pillars, despite that the economic aspects (AEC) seems more important than the security and socio-cultural pillars.

New regionalism of ASEAN will be betting Southeast Asian communities that wibe faced with significant population growth before and after 2015. According to predictions that released at the ASEAN Summit in Brunei Darussalam in 2013, the population of 10 ASEAN countries is

expected 741.2 million by 2035 , an increase compared to 2015 is estimated at 633.1 million. The average population growth per year ASEAN increas 0.85 percent and the Philippines become the country with the highest population growth (1.44%), followed by Malaysia (1.45%), Brunei Darussalam (1.40%), Laos (1, 06%), Cambodia (1%), Singapore (0.93%), Indonesia (0.74%), Vietnam (0.65%) and Thailand (0.29%).

The Roadmap shows assertiveness of ASEAN in the new era, both in repon to new political issues as democratization and human rights , as well as in responding to issues of non-traditional issue such as the problem of corruption (see *Roadmap*, ibid: 7-8). But on the other hand, the *Roadmap* shows that the perception about (new) regionalism patterns is still elitist, state-centris, or often called by some observers as "regionalism from above." The roadmap towards the formation of the ASEAN Community was actually "ahistoric" because since the beginning Southeast Asia is not a concept of "region". According to Anthony Reid (1999), Southeast Asia is a region that is historically different in compare with the other regions in the world such as Western Europe, India, the Arab World, China, and even the East Asian region is heavily influenced by the culture of China (cinized). Reid also said, "Southeast Asia has no common religion, language or culture of the great classics and has never been part of a polity (state) single. The contruction of Southeast Asia even by outsiders to facilitate geographically, which was then replaced with other terms that are even more unsatisfactory as India Far (Further India) or Indo-China (Reid, 1999: 4-5). Reid just want to argue that the external construction are inherent in the formation of the Southeast Asian region since a long time.

One characteristic of ASEAN is the strong models of conflict resolution typical of Asia that emphasize harmony, cooperation and non-intervention. In diplomacy, ASEAN leaders would rather suggests the patterns "quite diplomacy" or silent diplomacy in solving the problem. Reluctancy among actors still the patterns of diplomacy and it had been trapped ASEAN meeting into ritualism.

The Emerge of New Regional Actors

In line with the scenario to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015, a number of problems began to arise in this region. The non-traditional issue in which not of concern and not be seen in previous time, started to appear. Such issues on border, the environment (forest), migrant workers and human trafficking are some cases that must be accommodated in the construction of the new regionalism Southeast Asia. There is also less important is the issue of human trafficking in which Southeast Asia is one of the zones that are considered the most dangerous in the world. Securitization of the problems of non-traditional is not only need to manage with new perception from the traditional actors, but also accommodation on another perception of new actors who also exist in the transnational arena of Southeast Asia today.

In macro level, the phase of ASEAN as an association of cooperation amongst countries can be divided into two important periods. The second period showed patterns of transition, before the idea of integration of the ASEAN community emerged in the 13th Summit in Singapore (1997). The summit seems to be the culmination point which is important after a phase of *regionalism-making process* in the first two decades (1960-1980's) into *state-led regionalism* in the next two decades (1980s to present).

The regionalism making period refers to the creation and intrusion of Western countries that require a buffer zone of the East-West ideological conflict at that time. ASEAN is envisioned as a success story of Western modernization through the contagion effect and demonstration effect. The first effect concerns the efforts of the West (especially the United States) in widespreading developmentalism norm in the Southeast Asian region. The motive is not out of position and the role of Asia which is so important for the expansion of influence and global interests of the United

States. As written by Robert J Lieber, both politically and economically, Asia is home for massive investment from the western industries. Americans build security cooperation with some countries in Southeast Asia such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, India, Pakistan and, of course, South Korea and Japan. Some special schemes on security cooperation is also keen to do the United States through intensive engagement in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to continue and ensure the Southeast Asian region as strategic partner for economic and politics purposes.

The second effect - *demonstation effect* - regarding regional efforts to accelerate modernization. Southeast Asia is a role model for the spread of Western modernization (Simpson, 2008). Both of these efforts seemed run well, either by itself or by Western countries of ASEAN in the next few decades.

The *state-led regionalism* refers to the direct result of the impact of the emergence of a consolidated state as development actors in some Asian countries *(developmental-state)*. In this point of view, Southeast Asia was described as the group of geese that followed the main geese Asia, namely Japan. Some scientists call that ASEAN regionalism is a developmental-state regionalism which determines the state and the main actors. Developmental-state is a model of development policy that puts the state as a decision maker and decision taker at the same time. In terms of issues, this model gives more priority to the economic dimension *(Beeson, 2007)*. Meanwhile, Jayasurya (2001: 33) mentions the leadership phase of the Japanese industry has given rise to the phenomenon of "embedded mercantilism" in Southeast Asia where the state becomes an actor that is inherent in the whole building regional economic development. Consequently, regional initiatives are always oriented to the growth rather in development. At the same time, the qualification of actors should be involved in regional dynamics.

For a long time, the state became an important and pivotal actor of regionalism in the various schemes launched by the leaders of Southeast Asia. The most significant changes occurred before the decade of the 90s when the flow of human migration and transnational community movement began to give another perspective on the direction of regionalism. Hegemonic power in the first phase, namely the United States, which was provide for the formation of political intrution on roadmapping of ASEAN in the past, now should have compete with new emerging big powers. It is also inseparable from the rise of the power of middle-powers in international politics and economics. Average hegemonic power in the second phase, the goose Japan, also began shrinking economic roles in connection with the emergence of new economic powers in Asia such as South Korea, India, China and Taiwan. The persistence of ASEAN countries facing economic crisis of 1997 appears to be an important point for ASEAN to be more free form design and architecture of cooperation, from which all very loosely into a cooperation more systematic and structural. This then gave birth to a principle upheld by the ASEAN countries, namely the "ASEAN Way*" (Wirasenjaya and Herningtyas, 2013)*.

There are two important phenomena worthy identified ahead enters the era of ASEAN Community in terms of the change of actors and institutions both in external and internal levels. First, the reduced regimentation traditional strengths in international politics in Southeast Asia. Second, at the same time, there is also a reduced state's role as implication of the democratic transition process in a number of Southeast Asian countries. The first phenomenon led to the increasing number of spaces of interaction and cooperation amongst the ASEAN countries with a various new actors in international relations.

The second phenomenon where the role and position of the state also gradually reduce by the rise of transnational networks from regional civil society. The strength of civil society such as non-state organizations (NGOs) in ASEAN is now impossible to ignore the leading role. Various new issues in the regional scope began to emerge as a direct result of globalization and the presence

of actors outside the country increasingly articulate form communities outside the state radar. Such as the strength of civil society activists has designed initiatives linking the various elements and issues that cross national borders

The principle of non-interfering in the internal affairs of other countries that had been held by ASEAN as a regional manners now beginning a lot of criticism some circles. During this time there is a conflict perceptional involves a number of major issues such as the enforcement of human rights and democracy. Likewise, in the face of potential issues such as haze disarter. This case never become an issue of great attention 1997-1999. Tensions flared Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam. Indonesia is considered as the culprit of the disaster. At that time no ASEAN's efforts to overcome this. In addition because it has no clear instruments, ASEAN believes that neighboring countries are the most disadvantaged such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei tend to respond through diplomatic protests. Some of the help and assistance offered by Malaysia and Singapore. Again, this case has shown the reluctancy among ASEAN countries in diplomatic aspect.

The case of hostage in Sulu Sea is a sample of the emergence a non-traditional issue in ASEAN today. Within four months, from May to August 2016, Indonesian sailors have repeatedly been targeted as a hostage by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The trend is, however, using hostage as the instrument of increasing economic resources of their organization and movement. With regard to the ransom payment, there are two major arguments accounted. First, those who believe that both the company where the sailors work and the government have to pay the ransom despite the huge of money demanded by ASG. Supporters to this idea believe that saving the lives is far more valuable and urgent than the amount of ransom.

While the second argument considers the ransom as a trap which potentially bring Indonesian government and company into "rhytm of captors". For opponents of the ransom, even if the government is too soft and pay the financial demands were not cheap, this would be a bad precedent in the future. This would be followed by other cases against Indonesian citizens abroad. The other militant groups will replicate the pattern of ASG in capitalizing the hostage. Moreover, Indonesians would be, again, easily targeted by those militant groups since the government performs royal, yet weak indeed. Both decisions seem to be perplexing since it will either make the citizen to become the "ATM machine" for the radical movements or promote the idea that the government is anti-human.

State Souvereignty at the Crossroad

There is no doubt that Sulu Sea in the southern Philippines has been the hotspot for the criminals at sea given its significance for the seaborne trade worldwide, particularly between Indonesia and the Philippines. To this end, the questions of sovereignty and humanitarian actions emerge. Philippines government has so far been relying on its own capacity to overcome ASG and rejecting foreign military assistance due to its prestige and sovereignty. In international relations perspective, the posittion of Philippines government reflect a Hobbesian model. This perspective always belief that fostering state souvereignty is "sacred" goals.

Traffic in the Sulu Sea and Southeast Asia in general will be more dynamic as a result of the implementation of the ASEAN Community. This area will also be a very fragile region because it will be an easy target for pirates. Thus, it is critical to re-consider the state-centric security principle since it has proven slow in handling the citizen protection such as in the case of hostages by ASG.*By considering the case of hostage recurring and see the position in this strategic Sulu Sea there should be a paradigm shift in looking at this issue. Given the latest international political landscape characterized by the emergence of state interdependence, the Philippines government's stance which tends to be anachronistic should be revised. The Philippine government is also too

fixated on non-intervention principle that always maintained by ASEAN countries. The ASEAN architecture has experienced a transformation from old regionalism to new regionalism, which includes new challenges from non-trraditional arena.

 It is therefore critical to shift the paradigm that overcoming the threat posed by ASG is not only the responsibility of the Philippines government, but also Indonesia and Malaysia whose military assistances are also important. The ASEAN principle of non-interference has also exacerbated the situation.

At the regional level, it is time for ASEAN to reconstruct their regional security cooperation and redefine the meaning of "regional security". Security issues in ASEAN have been particularly focused on the traditional aspect such as open war, ideological contestation, balance of power, and others.

The limitations of state-centric approach, leaving the problem of representation. That is, the state perspective would be determined more by political calculation and technocratic. Whereas in handling problems of smog, for example, the problem is much more complex. Aspects of vernacular like view of the world (world view) of forest communities, economic and social problems faced by rural communities, far from the shadow state.

Various efforts to address environment in the ASEAN region reflects the realist approach where the dominance of state actors is still very strong. In order to solve the problem of smoke pollution, for example, ASEAN countries had made several attempts and finally in 2002 ASEAN agreed on a mutual commitment, called the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. In this agreement each State ratifying committed to participate solve the problem of haze pollution in Southeast Asia is largely due to forest fires in Indonesia.

On the issue of human rights, civil society networks that work to ASEAN on the issue of active float proposals ASEAN Human Rights Body. The agency is trying to adopt a similar institution that is well established in Europe. However, the proposal still hit due to perceptional differences and visions enforcement of human rights among the ASEAN countries themselves. These two issues - the environment and human rights, gave an overview of the actual state sovereignty which aspects are still enforced and on which aspects began having pulverization. Perhaps because human rights issues are still directly related to power a number of countries in the region, the countries using the human rights principle of "respect for sovereignty" to avoid conflict. While environmental issues, the idea does not seem strong enough to use. Even in environmental issues, mainstreaming actually carried out by civil society and the state to follow all of the design, the scope and actions designed civil society.

In one interesting analysis, Alexander C. Chandra (2009) argued about the need to change the way ASEAN regionalism from elitist becoming populist regionalism. Actually among ASEAN leaders themselves began to grow awareness to involve as many actors in developing the ASEAN Community. However, according to Chandra, the leaders in this region prefer the term people-oriented rather than people-centered. Both clearly imply two different things. In Chanda's point of view: "..... the people-oriented ASEAN can be interpreted that the policies pursued by the Association's policy-makers shall be oriented toward the cocerns and interests of the people. However, under this principle, the final decision making still lies amongst the region's political elite. In contrast, ASEAN as a people-centered organization call for the grouping to place people at the heart, or center, of its decision-making process .... "

Liked or not by policy makers in ASEAN, the presence of trans-national civil society has become an influential actor in the filed another point of view about the direction of Southeast Asian regionalism. Civil society groups are born through the process of expanding the democratic norm in most ASEAN countries, and as a direct result of the changing nature of international relations in

general. As alluded to earlier, various initiatives were born in responding to issues of non-traditional has spawned new patterns of cooperation, the alliance also civil society collaboration both within the Southeast Asian region itself and built by the civil society network that crossed the borders of the continent.

Civil society groups were quite articulate in responding and building collaborative work such as NGOs, academia in universities, faith-based movement, local communities, journalists and other new groups. New pathways diplomacy more open. All that gives agenda is quite clear about the need for ASEAN to develop regionalism multi-track regionalism in the future. ****

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